

CS 442

Introduction to Cryptography

Lecture 12: Pseudorandom Functions - III

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Defining Pseudorandom Functions

Definition: Let $G_{m,n,k} = \{G_{1,1}, \dots, G_{1,2^k}\}$ be a set of functions such that each $G_i: \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$. This set of functions $G_{m,n,k}$ is called a pseudorandom function if:

- * each G_i can be computed in polynomial time.
- * for every non-uniform PPT adversary, there exists a negligible function μ , such that $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\Pr[b = b'] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mu(n)$ in the following game:



Adv



Ch


Sample $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}$, $K \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$

if $b = 0$: $r_i = G_K(x_i)$

if $b = 1$: $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$

(keeps a table for previous answers)

polynomial
number of queries



Constructing a PRF (From PRG to PRF with n -bit input)

Goldreich - Goldwasser - Micali Construction.

* Let $G: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2n}$ be a length-doubling PRG.

* Let's define G_0 and G_1 as

$$G(s) = G_0(s) \parallel G_1(s)$$

i.e., G_0 chooses left half of G and G_1 chooses the right half.


* PRF construction: Set $K = s$. On n -bit input $x \in \{0,1\}^n$,

parse $x = x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n$

$$F_K(x) = G_{x_n}(G_{x_{n-1}}(\dots(G_{x_1}(K))\dots))$$

$$F_K(x) = G_{x_n}(G_{x_{n-1}}(\dots(G_{x_1}(K))\dots))$$

* We can represent F_K as a binary tree of size 2^n .



$$K_0^n = G_0(K_0^{n-1})$$

$$K_1^n = G_1(K_1^{n-1})$$

Why is this a PRF? (Proof Strategy)

Let's try to prove that this is a PRF. We consider the following hybrids:

$$H_1: F_K(x_1 \dots x_n) = G_{x_n}(\dots(G_{x_2}(G_{x_1}(K)))\dots)$$

$$H_2: F_K(x_1 \dots x_n) = G_{x_n}(\dots(G_{x_2}(s_1))\dots), \text{ where } s_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$$

$$H_3: F_K(x_1 \dots x_n) = G_{x_n}(\dots(s_2)\dots), \text{ where } s_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$$

⋮

$$H_n: F_K(x_1 \dots x_n) = s_n, \text{ where } s_n \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$$

- * The function defined in H_n is a random function. All we need to show is that the outputs of function defined in H_1 are computationally indistinguishable from the outputs of the function defined in H_n .
By hybrid lemma, this boils down to showing that $\forall i \in [n-1]$, the outputs of the function defined in H_i are computationally indistinguishable from the outputs of the function defined in H_{i+1} .
- * Let us consider H_1 and H_2 (all other H_i, H_{i+1} can be argued similarly). We know that $G_{x_1}(k)$ is computationally indistinguishable from $s_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$. Intuitively speaking, as a result, outputs of the form $G_{x_n}(\dots(G_{x_2}(G_{x_1}(k)))\dots)$ and $G_{x_n}(\dots(G_{x_2}(s_1))\dots)$ must also be computationally indistinguishable.
- * Note that this is not a formal proof. We are ignoring several subtleties here. The full proof is out of scope for now.

Example # 1

Q Let $\{f_k\}_k$ be a family of PRFs. Is $\{g_k\}_k$ also a family of PRFs, where $g_k(x) = f_k(x) \parallel f_k(\bar{x})$?

No! Consider an adversary who queries the challenger on input 0^n and receive $y_1 \parallel y_2$. Next the adversary queries the challenger on input 1^n and receive $y'_1 \parallel y'_2$. If $y_1 = y'_2$ and $y'_1 = y_2$, then the adversary knows with a very high probability that the challenger must be using g_k to answer his queries as opposed to a random function. Hence, this is not a PRF because the outputs of this function are easy to distinguish from those of a random function.

Example #2

Q Let $\{f_k\}_k$ be a family of PRFs. Is $\{g_k\}_k$ also a family of PRFs, where $g_k(x) = f_k(0||x) || f_k(1||x)$?

YES! Intuitively speaking, a single output of $g_k(\cdot)$ is equivalent to obtaining two different outputs of $f_k(\cdot)$ on related inputs. Since f_k is a PRF, we know that the outputs of $f_k(\cdot)$ are computationally indistinguishable from the outputs of a random function. Therefore, the outputs of $g_k(\cdot)$ must also be computationally indistinguishable from those of a random function.

Think! Why can't we use a similar argument in the previous example?

Review

- * Kerckhoff's Principle
- * Traditional Ciphers - No provable guarantees
- * Perfectly Secure Encryption
 - * Definition
 - * One-time Pad encryption
 - * Shannon's Theorem
 - * Limitations of Perfectly secure encryption.
- * Computational Security
 - * Computational assumptions
 - * Negligible functions
 - * Computationally secure encryption

- * Computational Indistinguishability
- * Hybrid Lemma
- * Pseudorandom generators
- * Pseudorandom OTP encryption
- * Proofs by reduction
- * Pseudorandom functions